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Wanting to have the cake and eat it may be a trait of scholars in the Critical Theory 
tradition. Illustrative of this is the following quote from Brunkhorst’s manuscript: 
“To explain the take-off of the social evolution I will combine the Hegelian notion 
of negation with Luhmann’s idea of communicative variation, Marx [sic, WS] 
concept of class-struggle, and Habermas [sic, WS] assumption that normative 
validity claims are unavoidable once Alter understands a symbolic expression of Ego.” 
(Brunkhorst 2013, 8). 
Although this sentence seems to have disappeared from the final version of the book, 
it does very accurately describe what happens in the book. And I actually like this a 
lot. I want to be convinced, and so I’m going to problematize the effort Brunkhorst 
undertakes somewhat. This band of four men, Hegel, Luhmann, Marx and 
Habermas, is no doubt easiest to deconstruct – that is, to take apart and to 
reconstruct anew from the inside – by focusing on the role of Luhmann. For having 
your cake and eating it too here seems to mean to speak of the system of law, of its 
evolution also, in terms of its mechanisms of variation, selection and retention or 
stabilization, and to yet combine this with a conception of a normative driver of 
evolution that is related to class struggle. Quite simply, this is impossible. On the 
one hand, having your cake and eating it too is an inability to choose, and maybe it’s 
just being greedy, or being a miser. Maybe it’s part of the universalistic claims typical 
of Critical Theory. But on the other hand, having your cake and eating it is a paradox, 
which is a very Luhmannian figure of thought. I’m going to take it as such, and I’ll 
continue to like it. And, to have said this as well, I want to admire the brightness of 
the analysis in Brunkhorst’s book. 
So I’ll interpret the main problem Brunkhorst’s book struggles with as the problem 
of combining an evolutionary perspective with a normative perspective. I’ll first take 
on the role of the Luhmannian critic. Then I’ll try to step away from that somewhat, 
and present a few issues from more esoteric angles. Let me first say though, that I 
struggle with this myself, and I know that many colleagues do as well. As for the 
systems-theory point of view, one cannot easily escape from the hold it has on one. 
As soon as one starts to combine it with other elements, critical elements for 
instance, troubles ensue. And from the perspective of critical theory, the potential 
gains are obvious – they lie in a much more consistent conception of system and 
environment – but the losses are immense because they lie in the normative core of 
the theory, which basically threatens to get jettisoned. The feeling one gets with 
Luhmann is that he already ate all the cake there is. What’s left are crumbs, and so, 
at best, we appear to be ‘after virtue’, to borrow Macintyre’s terms. 
 
Luhmann on law, norms and evolution 
Let’s start from Luhmann’s lapidary statement that “Die Gesellschaft ist, zum Glück, 
keine moralische Tatsache” (Luhmann 1987, 318). It indicates right away that social 
evolution cannot – at least in Luhmann’s view – be moralized. That is to say that 
social evolution never entails a driving role of normative claims, and neither does it 
result in some form of normative learning that is not internally induced. Likewise, 
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under conditions of functional differentiation, the codes of functional subsystems are 
morally indifferent. There is no congruency between what is true and what is good, 
between what is powerful and what is good, or between what is lawful and what is 
good. The world is definitely unplatonic, hence not a unity but functionally 
differentiated. Even the unity of the world appears many times in many systems and 
in equally many ways – and when it appears, it always appears as the unity of the 
difference between system and environment. So I’m starting off with some hardcore 
Luhmania here. I have no illusion of teaching Brunkhorst anything here, but I’m 
laying it out in order to highlight the tensions in his approach. Fundamentally, 
Luhmann’s conception boils down to the incongruence between law and morality, 
or between law and universal reason, or between law and anything it considers 
environment. That means there may be legal revolutions, or at least legal evolution, 
but what is legal has no bearing whatsoever on what is normatively good beyond the 
realm of law. 
Moreover, norms do not codify the system of law, and hence they do not make up 
the core of its self-organization. Any functional subsystem that operates on the basis 
of a specific medium and code does not operate through a normative code, nor can 
a normative code – under conditions of functional differentiation – be a functional 
equivalent of the codes of subsystems. Secondarily, certainly, one can normatively 
ground legal, political or economic action. But primarily such action is grounded by 
systemic codes that are normatively indifferent (cf. Luhmann 1993, 85). Therefore, 
Brunkhorst’s thesis that social evolution is driven by normative claims, argument or 
dissensus seems hard to maintain. It can be maintained, but only as one contingent 
take on social evolution that must then give up on connecting with the primary form 
of modern differentiation. In other words, norms are not social supermedia. At the 
level of subsystems, such as the legal system, norms are replaced by forms as drivers 
of autopoiesis, and hence ultimately of evolution – forms such as the binary code of 
law, lawful/unlawful. 
Luhmann in fact takes issue with the very notion of normative ‘learning’ in any other 
form than an internally induced learning (Luhmann 1993, 81). To connect 
normative learning to externalities, such as class struggle, seems to me to have effects 
akin to efforts at turning the hermeneutic circle into a spiral upwards towards better, 
more universalized understanding. For Luhmann, on the other hand, norms are 
expectations that are kept even when they are disappointed. That is, norms are 
primarily ways of not learning. Likewise and relatedly, Luhmann says of values: 
“unsolvable problems par excellence are today called ‘values’.” (Luhmann 1994, 19). 
Where Brunkhorst emphasizes normative learning, Luhmann considers norms as 
ways of not learning. One can argue, of course, that there are ways of learning in this 
not learning, but this would not exist as externally induced, and it is certainly hard 
to maintain that learning not to learn is a driver instead of a consequence of social 
evolution. Likewise, norms only function internally in the system of law. The legal 
system can refer cognitively to its environment, but not normatively (Luhmann 
1993: 85). 
In a sense, evolution in Luhmann’s terms is nothing other than the possibility of 
social systems to ignore expectations – including normative ones – in order to 
produce variation, and the temporalized restabilization of new variations. In that 
sense, the normative plays a role in evolution only insofar as it exists in a range of 
variation and can be selectively ignored. Most generally, social evolution is a process 
of demoralization, in which neither morality, nor values, nor norms are a source of 
integration. Rather, evolutionary complexity entails the heightening of 
implausibilities. 
This provides some background for the main issues I would like to highlight. 
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The problem of social evolution 
A crucial issue concerns Brunkhorst’s conceptualization of evolution. He 
distinguishes between evolutionary adaptation to a system’s environment, and to 
evolutionary constraints on such adaptation. Given the above, the question is how 
norms, or anything normative, could ever be a constraint on cognitive evolution? 
Because evolution concerns the primary differentiation of society, which is evidently 
not normatively supercoded, this seems altogether unlikely. 
But in my view, this conception of evolution is problematic in a more fundamental 
respect. In one particular sense that I wish to highlight, it marks a decisive break, 
although I don’t believe this is made explicit in Brunkhorst’s book, with Luhmann’s 
conception of social evolution, and it makes it harder yet to perform the balancing 
act between Hegel, Luhmann, Marx and Habermas. Brunkhorst says, for instance, 
that  “…modern law is not only the result of morally neutralized, gradual evolutionary 
adaptation of social systems to their environment (and hence of the cognitive 
learning of social systems which do not care about their negative externalities), but 
also the outcome of class struggle and revolutionary change (and hence of normative 
learning processes of social groups who demand rights for the victims of history, but 
with ambivalent effects).” (Brunkhorst 2014, 2-3). 
Throughout the book, Brunkhorst refers to evolution in the cognitive sense as a 
form of adaptation. But this is not at all how social systems relate to their 
environment. In fact, one uses a biological, organism-centered conception of 
evolution when adaptation is central. Evolution of social systems does not occur 
through adaptation, but through the maintenance of the incongruence between 
system and environment by means of irritation. Crucial to this is the relative degree 
of complexity between system and environment. The autopoiesis of social systems 
prevents them from ‘adapting’ to their environment. Their evolution is internally 
triggered by irritation from a self-induced environment, and it does not constitute 
adaptation because social systems do not thrive by adaptation to their environment, 
but by incongruence with their environment. In such an evolutionary perspective, 
there can be no question of linear – or quasi-linear – development (Luhmann 1994, 
7). 
This distinction between adaptation and irritation has consequences for 
Brunkhorst’s conception of law as providing normative constraints on adaptive 
evolution. First of all, as I just said, there is no adaptive evolution. But secondly, even 
if one were to hold that there is, it is altogether hard to imagine how law could 
provide normative constraints on it. After all, this would mean that the system of 
law could interfere in other autopoietic systems, and that is fundamentally impossible 
in autopoietic systems. And for the same reason, it is hard to see how social evolution 
in the form of normative learning in law could be considered as externally triggered, 
namely by class struggle, which, as Brunkhorst literally says in his conclusion, ‘causes’ 
legal revolutions (Brunkhorst 2014, 464). For that would mean that class conflict 
directly interferes with law, in which case there is no functionally differentiated 
system of law. Luhmann (1993, 77) maintains that the system of law is normatively 
closed and cognitively open, but that still means it can be directly steered neither 
normatively nor cognitively – nor, for that matter, by class conflict. Class struggle 
here emerges as an equivalent to what musical innovation was for Plato, when he 
wrote in The Republic: “for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole 
State, and ought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe him; 
– he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the State always 
change with them” (Plato 2000, 93). For Luhmann, that too would be a quite 
impossible impingement of the system of art on the system of law. Let me summarize 
the points I’ve just made as the first two main problems I see: 
1) Normative learning in law is construed as externally triggered, but normative 
learning can only be internally triggered, and anyhow social systems do not undergo 
direct external influence. 
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2) Law appears as a constraint upon its environment, which is considered here as an 
outside of the law, but social systems do not undergo direct external influence. 
These issues come out of Brunkhorst’s, in my view problematic, use of adaptation as 
central to evolution, which is then constrained by normative learning. 
 
The Kantian mindset 
Let me now move on to a second set of problems of a less orthodox Luhmannian 
nature. These center around what Brunkhorst calls the ‘Kantian mindset’. This he 
relates to the role of normative dissensus, as well as to the role of rational 
argumentation and the forceless force of the better argument in social evolution. I 
find the role he accords to normative dissensus or conflict, as well as the role of the 
Kantian mindset in this, problematic. 
If we, for starters, because it is the conceptual framework Brunkhorst uses, look at 
what Luhmann says about the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and 
retention or stabilization then it immediately becomes clear that norms do not figure 
anywhere. Variation has to do with language and its potential for negation; selection 
has to do with codes, and not with norms as Brunkhorst seems to imply; and 
stabilization has to do with system differentiation (Luhmann 2005a, 188). The point 
is that communication itself gives rise to negation and thereby to variation and 
evolution. In Brunkhorst’s book there is a constant slippage from “communicative 
variation” to “dissent over normative expectations” (Brunkhorst 2014, 16). In 
contrast to this, Brunkhorst seems to want to identify a driver of social evolution 
that is itself quasi-external to social evolution. He says for instance that: 
“…only interaction that generates argument and contest can explain how negative 
communication reaches such a large quantity that social evolution can and must take 
off.” (Brunkhorst 2014, 16-17). 
I believe this is problematic in a number of ways. First of all, it assumes that social 
evolution can only take off after the occurrence of what is itself a complex 
evolutionary achievement, namely argumentative, normative contestation. So I 
would take issue with normative contestation as a precondition, when it occurs in a 
certain ‘quantity’, for social evolution. But more importantly, I would criticize the 
entire move to find an external, perhaps even universal, driver of social evolution. 
For this is, ultimately, the role Brunkhorst accords to the Kantian mindset. The 
Kantian mindset operates in his theory as a universal driver of social evolution. He 
allows that it develops in social evolution, but at the same time it is, albeit in perhaps 
rudimentary form but existing since the Axial Age, a precondition and driver of social 
evolution. What happens is that in the negative potential of communication, which 
drives evolution, he sneaks in the Habermasian features of rational argument and its 
forceless force, which moreover gain certain universality. The decisive move is the 
sneaking in of rationality. From that moment on, he can claim that social evolution 
provides normative constraints for cognitive evolution. And from that moment on, 
the Kantian mindset can assume its magical function of allowing us to have a cake 
and eat it. It is also how Brunkhorst can make the following slip: 
“my main thesis is that of the co-evolution of cosmopolitan and national statehood. 
Throughout the evolution of modern law and politics, cosmopolitan state formation 
(…) has preceded and enabled particular and national state formation.” (Brunkhorst 
2014, 7). 
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The slip is from ‘co-evolution’ to ‘cosmopolitan state formation has preceded…’ 
Because the Kantian mindset operates as First Mover in Brunkhorst’s theory, the 
cosmopolitan is not really a co-evolutionary achievement, but it can precede national 
state formation. 
Most importantly, I would argue, normative dissensus, and ultimately what 
Brunkhorst calls the Kantian mindset, thus becomes a pre-evolutionary universal, 
which, en passant, divorces the take-off of social evolution from natural evolution, 
i.e., from the evolution of the capacities of language or communication more 
generally. So, in addition to my earlier two points, I’ll summarize my remarks on this 
issue in two further points: 
3) Social evolution does not take off as a consequence of a certain quantity of 
normative argument and contest. Such contestation is itself a product of social 
evolution, which emerges out of the inherent drive to negation and variation of 
contingency in communication. Not rational argument, but communication is in the 
driver’s seat. 
4) There is no external trigger to social evolution, other than, perhaps, natural 
evolution. In Brunkhorst’s book, the Kantian mindset functions as a pre-evolutionary 
universal. That is a lot of work to do for a mindset, even if it is a Kantian one that 
predates Kant by over 2000 years. 
Let me venture a guess as to why the Kantian mindset plays this role of a First Mover 
in Brunkhorst’s theory. The effect it has is one of moralizing social evolution, and I 
would say that that is what provides critical theory with its task and raison d’être. On 
the first page of his book, he immediately comes clean as to the purpose of critical 
theory: 
“Critical theory is about the paradox of reason within an unreasonable, brutish and 
random history. Methodologically, critical theory operates as an instrument to find 
the traces of reason and truth within a reality that as a whole is unreasonable and 
‘untrue’.” (Brunkhorst 2014, 1). 
I have to say I’m not such a fan of this type of gesture. It seems to me that it denies 
the rest of the world conscious access to that – namely Reason – to which it in the 
same move claims a monopoly on discovering. Now, inserting a Kantian mindset in 
between the three evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection and stabilization 
as a universal driver of social evolution inserts just enough reason in the world for 
critical theory to have a job. And as a corollary consequence, the negation still appears 
in some form as the way toward the positive, which here appears as the normative. 
The situation is akin to the response to the marginalization of the subject in modern 
society according to Luhmann: “Das theoretisch marginalisierte Subjekt kehrt als 
normatives Postulat menschenfreundlicher Ausrichtung der Gesellschaft zurück oder 
es rächt sich durch ‘Kritik’.” (Luhmann 1981, 251). Instead, I would argue that the 
negation does not help universal reason to unfold through normative learning 
processes, but that it merely enhances the contingent. 
 
Side comments 
Let me end with some side comments, four in total, and perhaps admittedly 
somewhat esoteric to Brunkhorst’s concerns. 
1) A first one has to do with an issue that runs through Brunkhorst’s argument and 
which I find interesting. The growth of the Kantian mindset can, I believe, be read 
as an alternative theory of secularization, in which the unfolding of reason through 
rational argumentation and the appending normative contestation grows out of 
initially religious developments and then, perhaps, evolutionarily frees itself from 
them. In many other approaches, including for instance Marcel Gauchet’s and 
Charles Taylor’s, the religious gives birth to the secular, but here, my question would 
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be simply if, taken to its evolutionary logical extreme – if not end-point – this 
conception, unlike at least Taylor’s, means that religion in the end will turn out to 
be a Weberian ‘vanishing mediator’. Does this development of the Kantian mindset 
entail the slow but gradual disappearance of religion? Probably not, at least I don’t 
see this empirically confirmed, but I would be interested in Brunkhorst’s take on the 
issue. 
2) A second comment concerns the contingency of Brunkhorst’s starting points. I 
have taken the route via Luhmann to deconstruct Brunkhorst’s approach, but what 
if we were to, for instance, take up Walter Benjamin’s perspective on law as laid out 
in Zur Kritik der Gewalt? In Benjaminian terms, the Kantian mindset operates as 
myth in Brunkhorst’s theory. And it remains locked in the vicious circle of 
instrumental language and law. The consequence is that it does not adequately grasp 
the violence of law in the way the exception continues to manifest itself in law. 
Empirically, there is much to be said for this (cf. Frankenberg 2010). 
3) Third, Brunkhorst explicitly denies Eurocentrism. But really? These four white 
German men informing his theory, do they get him beyond Eurocentrism? 
Obviously, just because certain trends, such as modern international law, are global 
does not mean they are not Eurocentric or, more generally, hegemonic in various 
ways. I doubt whether Brunkhorst actually has the tools, in his approach, to be 
reflexive about his own position. In the end, this is all a very modern story, which 
claims universality. Many a postcolonial scholar might almost consider that a 
definition of Eurocentrism. No doubt Brunkhorst starts with the papal revolution 
and not with, say, the Code of Ur-Nammu or the Code of Hammurabi, because the 
latter did not yet constitute a differentiation from politics. But they did constitute 
written law, and as Luhmann says, law is extremely vulnerable to evolution already 
because it consists of text, which is loaded with the potential for negation and 
variation (Luhmann 2005b, 223). 
4) Finally, when I try to take a wholly ‘external’ perspective, the entire focus on 
‘constraints’ appears to divert attention away from what social evolution has meant 
in terms of natural evolution. A primary characteristic of what human world society 
does to the world is not to constrain anything. Brunkhorst focuses on constraints 
because his is an internalist focus within world society. But does that not draw 
attention away from the role of world society on a planetary scale? The only model 
that adequately describes the evolution of human world society is that of the plague. 
Is that, finally, and putting it evocatively, not something a critical theory would want 
to scrutinize, rather than the various internal normative constraints humans amuse 
themselves with, all the while eating away at the world in a richer sense of the word?  
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